The Long-Run Performance of Sponsored and Conventional Spin-Offs by Klein, April & Rosenfeld, James
  
 





Stern School of Business 
New York University 
and 
James Rosenfeld 






Address Correspondence to:       Current Draft 
Prof. James Rosenfeld       March 5, 2008 
Goizueta Business School       Do Not Quote 
Emory University        Comments Welcome 
Atlanta, GA  30322 
Ph.:  (404) 727-7832 
E-mail: Jim_Rosenfeld@bus.emory.edu 
 
The Long-Run Performance of Sponsored and Conventional Spin-offs 
 
Abstract 
 Unlike a conventional spin-off, a sponsored spin-off takes place when the subsidiary to 
be divested sells an equity stake to an outside investor before going public, thereby receiving a 
substantial capital infusion.  We find that the stock return performance of a sample of 57 
sponsored spin-offs from 1994 through 2005 is significantly negative over a three-year period 
following the spin-off date.  In contrast, 182 conventional spin-offs over same interval record an 
average return performance.  The parent firms’ stock performance for the year preceding 
(following) the spin-off date is below-average (average), suggesting that their earlier 
performance was adversely affected by the subsidiary and motivated the parent to spin it off.  In 
support of this contention, we find that parent firms tended to under-invest in the subsidiary prior 
to the spin-off, due to the subsidiary’s limited growth opportunities.  This under-investment, in 
turn, could have motivated the subsidiary to seek outside funding sources before going public. 
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I. Introduction
 A spin-off occurs when a firm distributes at least 80% of its shares in a wholly-owned 
subsidiary to its existing shareholders on a pro-rata basis, thereby creating a separate publicly-
traded company.  In general, spin-offs are accompanied by positive short-run and long-run stock 
performances for both the parent and spun-off firm (see Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2006) for a 
review of papers).  However, recent studies show that these stock returns depend on various factors 
such as whether the spin-off is focus-increasing or focus-decreasing to the parent (Daley, Mehrotra 
and Sivakumar (1997); Desai and Jain (1999)), the spin-off’s subsequent operating performance 
(Daley, Mehrotra and Sivakumar (1997); Desai and Jain (1999)), and the growth opportunities of 
the spun-off division prior to the spin-off (Siddiqui and Warganegara (2003)). 
 We examine a different aspect of spin-offs – whether or not an outside investor purchases a 
substantial equity stake in the newly-created firm at or around the spin-off date.  We compare these 
“sponsored” spin-offs to “conventional” spin-offs in terms of long-run stock performances, return 
on assets, growth opportunities, capital expenditures and earnings per share.1
 Our motivations for separating spin-offs into sponsored and conventional spin-offs are two-
fold.  First, we find that parent firms increasingly are seeking substantial equity infusions from 
outside investors to help facilitate the separation of the spun-off division’s net assets from the 
parent’s net assets.  From 1994-1998, the first five years of our sample, only 16 of the 119 spin-offs 
are sponsored, accounting for just 13.4 percent of total spin-offs.  In contrast, sponsored spin-offs 
comprise 34.2 percent of total spin-offs (41 out of 120) from 1999–2005.  This dramatic growth in 
sponsored spin-offs demonstrates that parent firms and their bankers perceive advantages to these 
capital infusions. 
                                                 
1 We borrow the term “sponsored” spin-off from the Wall Street Journal (10/17/00).  We call all other types of spin-offs 
“conventional” spin-offs.  
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 Second, we expand on the literature concerning the influence of large stakeholders on the 
return and operating performances of the companies in which they invest.  An examination of the 
identities of the blockholders reveals they primarily are sophisticated investors, such as Warren 
Buffett, the Gabelli Fund, Morgan Stanley and Forstmann Little.  The finance literature offers 
competing views on how large blockholders may affect future performances of spun-off firms. 
Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998) find that large blockholders are more likely to target 
firms with relatively low returns on assets (ROA) and poor growth opportunities, the latter proxied 
by the firms’ market-to-book ratios.  Brav et al. (2008) and Klein and Zur (2008) examine hedge 
fund activists and find that these large blockholders tend to target high performing firms.  All three 
studies report significantly positive abnormal returns surrounding the filing of the initial SEC 
Schedule 13D, as well as long-run improvements in ROA and/or subsequent positive stock returns   
Therefore, these papers suggest that sponsored spin-offs should have positive, long-run abnormal 
stock returns following the spin-off. 
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) examine the long-run stock and operating 
performances following private placements of equity from 1980 to 1996.2  Unlike Bethel, 
Liebeskind and Opler (1998), they find that firms with private equity placements have relatively 
high market-to-book ratios, as well as high capital expenditures prior to the private placement.  
They also report significantly negative long-run stock returns and operating performances following 
the private placement.  Thus, their study suggests that sponsored spin-offs should have negative 
long-run abnormal stock returns following the spin-off. 
In this paper, we examine the causes and consequences of sponsored spin-offs for a sample 
of 57 firms from 1994 through 2005.  As a comparison, we also perform the same set of analyses on 
 
2 A "private equity placement" describes a company's cash sale of its securities made in reliance upon exemptions from 
registration requirements contained in the applicable securities legislation.  Private placement investments often are 
limited to institutional investors, accredited/sophisticated investors, hedge funds, venture capitalists, and corporate 
insiders. The assumption is made that these investors are better positioned to assess and manage the risks associated 
with these investments. 
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182 conventional spin-offs over the same time period.  Our main result is that sponsored spin-offs 
differ from conventional spin-offs in several dimensions. 
Using the Carhart (1997) four factor model, we find significantly negative one-, two- and 
three-year post-event alphas for the sponsored spin-offs.  These results are robust to both equally 
weighted and value weighted portfolios.   In contrast, we find no evidence that conventional spin-
offs under-perform the market. Further, the announcement-day effect on sponsored spin-offs is 
negligible while, similar to earlier event studies, the conventional spin-offs’ two-day response is 
significantly positive.   
We also examine stock return performances for the parent firms.  For the one-year period 
prior to the spin-off, we find insignificant alphas for the parent firms of conventional spin-offs; 
whereas, we find a significantly negative alpha for the parent firms of the sponsored spin-offs.  
Neither group of spin-offs records statistically significant post-event one-, two-, or three year 
alphas.  These results suggest that sponsored spin-offs might be responsible for the parents’ sub-par 
pre-event performance that, in turn, could have motivated the parent to divest itself of the 
subsidiary.   
To examine this possibility, we calculate operating performances, the amounts that were 
invested in the subsidiaries, and the subsidiaries’ growth opportunities both prior to and after the 
sponsored spin-off.  Our findings on all three factors support the view that sponsored spin-offs were 
and remain poor performers.  In the one-year period prior to the spin-off, the ROA for the sponsored 
spin-offs and their parent firms are each significantly lower than their respective matched group of 
firms.  For each of the three years following the spin-off date, the sponsored spin-offs record lower 
return on assets (ROAs), while the parent firms’ ratios are similar to a portfolio of matched firms.  
When examining capital expenditures and Tobin’s q for the sponsored spin-offs, we find similar 
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patterns.  In contrast, conventional spin-offs’ ROAs, capital expenditures and Tobin’s q ratios, for 
the most part, are not significantly different from their control samples. 
Finally, we bring together the poor long-term operating and stock return performances by 
comparing analysts’ EPS forecasts to the divested subsidiary’s reported EPS following the spin-off. 
We find evidence that the market does not fully anticipate these sub-par operating results. 
Overall, the results support the view that sponsored spin-offs are different from conventional 
spin-offs.  They also suggest that the parent’s low ROA and under-investment in the subsidiary are 
partially motivated by the subsidiary’s lack of growth opportunities.  This under-funding by the 
parent firm might help explain the subsidiary’s decision to seek outside funding sources, via a 
sponsor, prior to the spin-off.  We conclude that despite the equity infusion at the time of the spin-
off, the market slowly recognizes the newly-minted firm’s limited investment opportunities. 
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the sample selection 
process, Section III describes the research design, and Section IV presents the empirical results.  
Summary and conclusions are presented in the final section.  
 
 
II. Sample Selection and Description 
 An initial listing of 336 possible spin-offs over the period January 1994 through December 
2005 was obtained from the Thomson Financial Security Database.3  The Wall Street Journal Index 
and EDGAR database were jointly used to confirm which of these firms qualified as a spin-off, the 
date of the spin-off, and the name of the parent firm.  We eliminate 97 firms either because we could 
find no mention of them in either the WSJ Index or EDGAR database or their stock prices were not 
available in the CRSP Daily Master File.  This process reduced the final sample to 239 spin-offs.  
This sample size is comparable to Danielova (2008), who identify 164 spin-offs between 1991 and 
                                                 
3 Our sample period begins January 1994 because this is the earliest period covered by the EDGAR database, which was 
used to identify the sponsored spin-offs. 
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2002. 
 The EDGAR database was further used to identify those spin-offs that were investor 
sponsored.  Any person or group of persons who purchases 5 percent or more of the subsidiary’s 
outstanding shares (either before or after the spin-off) must file either a Schedule 13G or a Schedule 
13D statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within ten business days 
following the date of purchase.4  The filed statement was then reviewed to determine the identity of 
the investor, the date that the shares were purchased, and the percentage of shares that were 
purchased.  If the purchase date preceded the spin-off date, it was classified as a sponsored spin-off.   
 Of the 239 spin-offs, we classify 57 firms (23.8 percent) as sponsored spin-offs and 182 
(76.2 percent) as conventional spin-offs.  Appendix A lists the names of the 57 sponsored spin-off 
firms, the parent company of each spin-off, and the identity of the sponsor(s) including their 
percentage ownership in the subsidiary.  The ownership stake ranges from 5.0 percent (Sabre 
Holding and Transpro) to 51.8 percent (Packaging Dynamics).  There are 15 spin-offs that have two 
or more sponsors by the date of the spin-off. 
 Table I gives a yearly breakdown of the spin-off activity for both the full sample of spin-offs 
and sponsored spin-offs.  From 1994-1998, just 16 of the 119 spin-offs (13.4 percent) are sponsored 
spin-offs.  In contrast, from 1999 through 2005, 34.2 percent of all spin-offs (41 out of 120) are 
investor sponsored.  These statistics show that the sponsored spin-off became relatively more 
prevalent over time.  The year-by-year breakdown also demonstrates that sponsored spin-offs were 
not an artifact of the “market bubble” that ended in 2000. 
 Table II presents financial and market data at the time of the spin-off on four sample groups:  
sponsored spin-offs, conventional spin-offs, parents of sponsored spin-offs, and parents of 
conventional spin-offs.  To calibrate the relative size of the sponsored spin-off vis-à-vis its parent, 
 
4 A Schedule 13G is filed if the investor is a passive investor.  A Schedule 13D is filed if the investor intends to 
influence the firm’s policies, or if the investor is unwilling to give up the option of affecting the firm. 
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we present both accounting data in Panel A and market-based data in Panel B.  The total assets and 
net sales data in Panel A are available for the spin-offs from their post-spin-off financial statements; 
the data for the parents are on Compustat.  The market value of equity in Panel B is taken from 
CRSP and is the closing price on the spin-off date.  The book value of equity is at the end of the 
fiscal year preceding the spin-off date. 
 As Panel A shows, the median values for the two spin-off (parent) groups prior to the spin-
offs are comparable in terms of total assets and net sales.5  These findings suggest that in terms of 
size, whether measured as assets or revenues, there are no discernible differences between sponsored 
and conventional spin-offs. 
 As each panel shows, the subsidiary comprises a significant part of the firms’ operations.  
For example, in Panel A, the sponsored spin-offs’ median value of total assets is $605.9 million 
compared to $1,481.3 million for their parents.  This indicates that the sponsored spin-offs’ median 
asset value is 40.9 percent as large as their parents’ corresponding value.  In terms of net sales, the 
sponsored spin-offs also accounted for a fairly large percentage of the parents’ revenues ($486.5 
million verus $1,543.4 million, or 31.5 percent).  Because sponsored spin-offs are large relative to 
their parents, their annual operating performance in the year preceding the spin-off date should have 
a material influence on the parents’ same-year performance.  This issue is examined in Section IV-
B, when we focus on the parent firms’ stock performances over the periods preceding and following 
the spin-off date. 
 Regarding the book value-to-market value of equity ratios in Panel B, sponsored spin-offs 
record median (mean) values of 0.89 (0.62), compared to 0.63 (0.43) for conventional spin-offs, a 
difference that is statistically significant at the 0.05 (0.05) level.  The median (mean) book-to-
market ratio for the sponsored spin-offs is also considerably higher than their parent firms’ 
 
5 Using mean values, both the sponsored spin-offs and their parents are significantly smaller than the conventional spin-
offs and their parent firms.  However, because the accounting data is highly skewed, we consider the median values to 
be a more reliable measure of central tendency. 
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corresponding ratio of 0.48 (0.44) (not tabulated).  These findings provide preliminary evidence that 





 Our first series of tests measure the degree of success experienced by our sample of 
sponsored spin-offs by documenting their return performances following the spin-off date.  We also 
compute the return performances for the conventional spin-offs as well as the parent firms for both 
groups of spin-offs. Consistent with recent studies conducting long-run performance tests [e.g., 
Hertzel et al. (2002)], we use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model as our main model of 
performance measurement: 
Rit - Rft = αi + bi(Rmt - Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + miUMDt + εit ,                          (1) 
To calculate long-run abnormal returns we use the calendar-time portfolio approach first used by 
Jaffee (1974) and Mandelker (1974) and strongly advocated by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000).  Specifically, we construct post-event, calendar-time portfolios each month and 
include those stocks that have a spin-off within a one-, two- and three-year window prior to the 
month in question. The motivation for using the calendar-time approach is to account for the 
positive cross-correlation of abnormal returns.  Specifically, because there is considerable overlap 
in the sample firms’ performance windows, individual alphas will be cross-sectionally dependent.  
The calendar-time approach is designed to address this statistical problem. 
 Next, we examine the financial characteristics of spin-offs and their parent firms over 
periods preceding and following the spin-off.  The firm-specific characteristics we investigate are 
operating performance, defined as return on assets, capital expenditures and Tobin’s q ratio.  We 
compare these measures with the corresponding statistics from a matched portfolio of firms.  The 
Compustat database is used to identify the portfolio of matched firms.  Specifically, for each sample 
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firm, we find control firms on Compustat that are in the same industry using the Fama and French 
(1997) 48 industry classification.  We then identify all firms with a market value of equity within 
ten percent of the sample firm’s market value equity as of the spin-off date.  If there are less than 
five control firms with a market value of equity within ten percent of the sample firm’s size, we also 
include those control firms with a value within 20 percent of the sample firm’s size.  From this set 
of firms, we choose the firm with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the sample firm.6  
Finally, we compare analysts’ EPS forecasts made within 60 calendar days after the spin-off with 




 A.  Return Performances of Sponsored Spin-offs and Conventional Spin-offs 
Table III presents the abnormal returns for the spun-off subsidiaries over the post-spin-off 
period using one-, two- and three-year windows.  As Panel A shows, the post-spin-off alphas using 
equally weighted portfolios are all significantly negative at the 0.05 significance level.  Specifically, 
the one-, two-, and three-year alphas are -0.0133 (t-stat = -2.0691), -0.0161 (t-stat = -2.2776) and     
-0.0151 (t-stat = -2.3141), respectively.  This translates to cumulative abnormal returns of -15.96%, 
-38.64% and -54.22% over the one-, two- and three-year intervals.  The corresponding statistics 
using value weighted portfolios are consistent with these results.  Specifically, the one-, two- and 
three year alphas are -0.0108 (t-stat = -1.8652), -0.0121 (t-stat = -1.9932) and -0.0133 (t-stat =         
-2.1844), the latter two periods significant at the 0.05 level.  These results strongly suggest that 
sponsored spin-offs perform poorly in the long run.7
                                                 
6 Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that the use of “reference portfolios” (i.e., a portfolio of matched firms) to calculate 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns can yield biased test statistics and argue that using a single matched firm (i.e., “control 
firm”) eliminates these sources of bias. 
7 Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1993) find that their spin-off sample’s significantly positive return performance is 
driven entirely by the subsample of firms that were acquired by another party during the three-year, post-event period.  
Since sponsored spin-offs are underperformers rather than overperformers, removing the acquired firms from our 
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To further examine these negative alphas, we separate the sponsored-spin-offs into those 
that are “focus-increasing” and “non-focus-increasing” based on their four-digit S.I.C. codes.  Desai 
and Jain (1999) report that focus-increasing spin-offs (the subsidiary is in a different industry code 
than the parent firm) experience significantly positive abnormal returns over one-, two- and three-
year periods following the spin-off.  In contrast, non-focus-increasing spin-offs (the subsidiary is in 
the same industry code as the parent) record negative, but not statistically significant, abnormal 
returns over a three-year period.  From our sample of 57 sponsored spin-offs, we find that 40 are 
focus-increasing while only 17 are non-focus-increasing.  This finding suggests that the negative 
performance by the sponsored spin-offs cannot be attributed to the preponderance of non-focus-
increasing spin-offs.  In fact, they suggest that the negative performance we document would have 
been even worse if not for the high percentage of focus-increasing spin-offs in our sample. 
The negative alphas in Panel A are consistent with the Hertzel et al. (2002) performance tests 
on private equity placements.  Sponsored spin-offs are similar to private equity placements in that both 
provide the subsidiary/firm with a capital infusion from a private investor.  There are, however, a 
number of important differences between the two strategies.  For a sponsored spin-off to be a tax-free 
exchange, the blockholders’ voting rights (economic interest) cannot exceed 19.9 percent (50.0 
percent), while private equity placements are not accorded any such tax advantages.  Further, all of the 
capital provided by the investor in a sponsored spin-off goes directly to the subsidiary because the 
parent firm is not part of the contractual agreement,8 whereas in a private equity placement all of the 
proceeds go to the parent.  But perhaps the major difference between the two is that investors in a 
private equity placement usually receive a substantial discount from the stock’s market price, typically 
 
sample should, at the very least, not change our basic inferences.  When we run the performance tests on the unacquired 
sponsored spin-offs, using both equally weighted and value weighted portfolios, the alphas remain significantly 
negative.  When we remove the acquired firms from the conventional spin-off sample, all of the alphas remain positive, 
but none are statistically significant at conventional levels. 
8 However, this does not prevent the subsidiary from transferring part, or all, of this capital back to the parent firm if a 
prior arrangement existed between the two parties. 
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in the 15-20 percent range.  In contrast, investors in sponsored spin-offs do not receive a discount from 
the issuer.  Hertzel et al. (2002) argue that due to the private equity placement’s negative post-issue 
abnormal returns, this discount might be necessary to compensate potential investors, who apparently 
anticipate this negative performance.  In the case of sponsored spin-offs, by definition, we cannot 
make the same argument. 
We next perform our tests on the conventional spin-offs to see if sponsored spin-offs and 
conventional spin-offs experience different long-run return performances. By examining 
conventional spin-offs, we address two questions.  First, are sponsored spin-offs similar or different 
from spin-offs that do not have large blockholders?  Second, is the sub-par performance for the 
sponsored spin-offs an artifact of the time period used in this study?  Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge 
(1993) report significantly positive two- and three-year, post-spin-off abnormal returns for a sample 
of spin-offs over 1965-1988.  In contrast, McConnell, Ozbilgin and Wahal (2001) and Desai and 
Jain (1999) report insignificant positive long-run abnormal returns for spin-offs over 1989-1995 and 
1975-1991, respectively.  Thus, it appears that spin-off performances are influenced by the time 
period under evaluation.   
Panel B of Table III reports the findings for the conventional spin-offs.  For the equally 
weighted portfolios, the alphas for all three windows are positive, but statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels.  The value-weighted results are stronger with alphas of 0.0161 and 0.0151 over 
the two- and three- year windows, respectively, both significant at the 0.05 level.  Because of these 
mixed results, it is not clear whether we can classify the conventional spin-off as above-average 
performers.  Nevertheless, the results in Table III support the conclusion that the long-run 
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performance of sponsored spin-offs are different from that of conventional spin-offs, and that these 
differences cannot be attributed to the time period studied.9
 
B.     Return Performance of Parent Firms of Sponsored and Conventional Spin-offs 
 The finding that the sponsored spin-offs are under-performers suggests that one possible 
motivation for the parent’s decision to divest itself of the subsidiary is to eliminate a division whose 
operating performance is having a negative effect on the value of the parent’s common stock.  To 
investigate this possibility, we compute alphas for both groups of parents over the year preceding 
the spin-off date, as well as for the three-year period following the spin-off.  
 The results for the parents of sponsored spin-offs are shown in Panel A of Table IV.  Over 
the year preceding the spin-off, the equally weighted alpha is -0.0092 (t-value = -1.8923) while the 
value-weighted measure is -0.0085 (t-value = -1.7488), both significant at the 0.10 level.  In 
contrast, none of the post-event alphas, whether equally weighted or value weighted, are statistically 
significant.  Together, these results provide preliminary evidence that parent firms divest the 
subsidiaries because they are a drag on the parents’ stock performances.   
 The performance tests for the parents of conventional spin-offs over the same sample period 
are reported in Panel B of Table IV.  In contrast to the parents of sponsored spin-offs, the equally 
weighted (value weighted) alphas for the one-year interval preceding the spin-off date is 0.0129 
(0.0041) and not statistically significant. These results suggest that the negative pre-event abnormal 
returns by the parents of the sponsored spin-offs is not time specific, but rather due to the below 
average performance of the sponsored spin-offs.  For each of the periods following the spin-off, 
none of the alphas are statistically significant at conventional levels.   
 
9 As a robustness check, we redid the performance tests using the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) approach by 
comparing the sponsored spin-offs’ returns with those of a portfolio of firms matched by industry, size and book-to-
market ratio.  The results are just as strong.  For example, the mean BHAR for the one- two- and three-year intervals 
following the spin-off are –24.81, -37.64 and –48.21 percent, respectively, and all are statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. 
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C. Announcement-Day Returns for Sponsored and Conventional Spin-offs 
 Prior studies on the spin-off announcement-day effect report a significantly positive market 
response to this event. Similarly, Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) find that the 
announcement of a private equity placement results in a significantly positive abnormal return over 
the announcement period.  Because Hertzel et al. (2002) show that firms with private equity 
placements under-perform the market over a three-year window following the event, they contend 
that the positive direction of the announcement-day effect is inconsistent with the under-reaction 
hypothesis and is, therefore, an “incorrect” response.   
 We find that the sponsored spin-offs’ two-day abnormal return is just 0.21 percent with an 
insignificant t-value of 0.26. This finding contrasts with the significantly positive announcement-
day abnormal returns reported by Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993), further indicating 
differences between sponsored spin-offs and private equity placements. 
  In contrast, the abnormal return for the conventional spin-offs is 2.80 with a corresponding 
t-value of 3.00, statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  The latter result is very similar to those 
reported in earlier studies on spin-off announcements.10  The difference between the two samples’ 
announcement-day results is statistically significant of the 0.05 level (t-value = 2.11), suggesting 
that the market responds differently to sponsored spin-offs when compared to conventional spin-
offs.   
 
D.     Operating Performances of Spin-offs and Their Parent Firms 
 
The preceding analysis shows that over the three years following the divestiture, sponsored 
spin-offs, unlike conventional spin-offs, are under-performers.  We also find evidence that the 
parents of sponsored spin-offs are under-performers over the year preceding the spin-off, while the 
 
10 Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2006) report that the weighted average abnormal return for a number of spin-off studies 
is 3.31 percent. 
 13
parents of conventional spin-offs record an average performance.  To further investigate these 
phenomena, we measure the operating performances of both spin-off groups and their parents over 
the fiscal year preceding the spin-off date and each of the three full fiscal years following the event.  
We then compare these results with those of their corresponding matched firms with the same fiscal 
year as the sample firm.  Similar to Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler. (1998), Klein and Zur (2008) and 
Brav et al. (2008), we measure operating performance as the return on assets (ROA), computed by 
dividing each firm’s EBITDA by its total year-end assets.   EBITDA and total assets are taken from 
Compustat.  Annual reports supplement the data for some of the spin-offs. 
 Panel A of Table V reports the results for the sponsored spin-offs.  For the fiscal year 
preceding the spin-off date (year -1), the median ROA is 7.80 percent versus 11.52 percent for their 
matched firms, a difference that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  The parametric mean 
tests also support the findings (8.28 percent versus 12.15 percent, statistically significant at the 0.05 
level).  For the first full fiscal year after the spin-off date (year +1), the sponsored spin-offs’ median 
ROA is 6.12 percent compared to 12.11 percent for the matched firms, a difference that is 
statistically significant at the .05 level.  For the second and third years following the divestiture, the 
sponsored spin-offs’ ROA also under-performs relative to their matched firms.  While these results 
are in contrast to those of Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998), who report modest improvements in 
ROAs over this time span, they are not inconsistent with the significantly negative alphas recorded 
by the sponsored spin-offs over the post-event intervals. 
Panel B of Table V shows that the parent firms’ median ROA for year -1 is significantly 
lower than the matched firms (8.83 percent versus 11.28 percent, significant at the 0.10 level).  It 
should be noted that this ROA includes the operating performance of the soon-to-be-spun-off 
subsidiary.  For the three post-spin-off years, the parents have median and mean ROAs that are not 
significantly different from those of their matched firms.  These findings are in line with the parent 
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firms’ average stock return performance over the post-event periods following the spin-off and 
provide additional evidence that the parents’ under-performance in year -1 can be attributed to their 
spun-off subsidiaries.  
 
E. Spun-off Subsidiaries’ Capital Expenditures and Investment Opportunities 
 We next investigate the degree to which the parent invests resources in the subsidiary prior 
to the spin-off.  As a division within the parent’s organization, the subsidiary must, in most cases, 
rely on the parent firm to finance its capital investments.  If the parent perceives the subsidiary as 
either having performed below expectations and/or has limited growth opportunities, it might be 
more prone to under-invest in the subsidiary and, instead, put more resources into its more 
profitable divisions.  One way to investigate this possibility is to examine the subsidiary’s capital 
expenditures-to-sales ratio before and after the spin-off.11  We then compare this ratio to the capital 
expenditures-to-sales ratio of their corresponding matched firms used in our earlier performance 
tests.  Data are from annual reports and the Compustat database. 
The results are reported in Table VI, Panel A.  For year -1, the median (mean) capital 
expenditures/sales ratio for the sponsored spin-offs is 4.74 (7.08) percent versus 6.68 (12.32) 
percent for the matched firms, a difference that is statistically significant at the 0.05 (0.01) level.  
For year +1, the sponsored spin-offs’ median and mean ratios remain lower than their matched 
firms, but the differences are not statistically significant.  However, for years +2 and +3, both 
median and mean ratios are significantly lower than those of the matched firms.  These results are in 
direct contrast to the findings of Hertzel et al. (2002), who document above-average capital 
expenditures for several years preceding as well as following the year of the private equity 
 
11 This approach has been used in a number of studies to examine a parent firm’s relative investment allocation among 
its divisions [e.g., Dittmar and Shivdasani (2001)]. 
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placement.12  They argue that this is evidence that these firms were overly optimistic about the 
potential of their internal investments.  Our finding that parent firms constrain the capital 
expenditures of sponsored spin-offs prior to the spin-off suggests they act more rationally when 
setting the subsidiaries’ capital budget.   
 The fact that the parents limit their subsidiaries’ capital expenditures raises the question of 
why this occurred.  One obvious candidate would be limited investment opportunities for the 
subsidiary.  Accordingly, we estimate Tobin’s q, defined as total market value of equity plus book 
value of debt divided by the book value of assets, as a proxy for each sample’s growth 
opportunities.  Panel B of Table VI shows that for year -1, the sponsored spin-offs record a median 
(mean) q ratio of 0.78 (1.23) versus 1.27 (2.02) for the matched firms, a difference statistically 
significant at the 0.05 (0.05) level.  These results are also consistent with the relatively high book-
to-market ratios reported in Table II and, again, are in contrast to those found by Hertzel et al. 
(2002), who show that firms with private placements have significantly low book-to-market ratios 
in the fiscal year prior to the equity placement.  For each of the three fiscal years following the spin-
off date, the sponsored spin-offs’ Tobin’s q ratios remain significantly lower than the matched 
firms, suggesting little or no improvement in their investment opportunities.    
 Overall, these results show that the parent’s decision to under-invest in sponsored spin-offs 
before the divestiture is at least partially motivated by the subsidiary’s below-average growth 
opportunities.  They could also explain why the subsidiary sold a substantial stake in its equity 
before it was spun-off to the parent’s shareholders.  That is, it was a strategy to raise needed capital 




12 To measure the level of capital expenditures, they add research and development expenditures to capital expenditures 
and divide the sum by total assets. 
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F. Operating Performance, Capital Expenditures and Tobin’s q: Conventional Spin-offs and 
Parents 
 We now turn our attention to conventional spin-offs.  As Panel A of Table VII shows, the 
median and mean ROAs for the conventional spin-offs for year -1 are not significantly different 
than those found for their matched samples.  Overall, the same is true for the post-spin-off years.  
These results are in contrast to the sponsored spin-offs’ negative ROA comparisons reported in 
Panel A of Table V and support the view that conventional spin-offs are different than its sponsored 
counterparts.   
. For the parent firms, shown in Panel B, the ROA for year-1 is not significantly different 
from their matched firms.   This finding differs from the sponsored spin-offs’ parents, which 
experienced a negative ROA in year -1.  Similar to our findings in Table V, however, we find no 
over- or under-performance by the parents of conventional spin-offs in the post-spin-off period. 
 In Table VIII, we present capital expenditures and Tobin’s q ratio for the conventional spin-
offs.  As Panel A shows, we find no meaningful differences in capital expenditures between the 
conventional spin-offs and their matched firms during the pre-event and post-event years.  From 
Panel B we find that the conventional spin-offs’ Tobin’s q for the pre-and post-event years, is, on 
balance, not statistically different from the matched firms’ Tobins’ q.   These results differ from 
those reported for sponsored spin-offs, and illustrate further the differences between the two types 
of transactions. 
  
G. Forecasted EPS versus Actual EPS 
In the preceding sections, we find that the sponsored (conventional) spin-offs’ operating 
performances and investment opportunities are below-average (average) compared to a portfolio of 
matched firms.  In order to argue that these results are consistent with their post-spin-off stock 
performances documented in Section A, we have to show that the market had not fully anticipated 
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these operating statistics at the time of the sponsored spin-off, whereas it did anticipate the same 
statistics for the conventional spin-offs. 
 We test this assertion by comparing the spun-off subsidiaries’ earnings per share (EPS) with 
analysts’ projections following the spin-off date.  Specifically, using the IBES database, we 
compare EPS of the sponsored (conventional) spin-offs with their consensus analysts’ forecasted 
EPS for each of the three fiscal years including and following the year of the spin-off. We define the 
consensus forecast as either the mean or the median of all initial forecasts made by individual 
analysts within 60 calendar days after the spin-off date. 
 The results for the sponsored spin-offs are shown in Panel A of Table IX.  For all three 
years, reported EPS is significantly lower than the forecasted EPS by a considerable margin.  For 
year 0, the fiscal year surrounding the spin-off date, the mean (median) forecasted EPS is $0.429 
($0.725) compared to $0.268 ($0.561), statistically significant at the 0.05 (0.10) level.  For the 
following two years, these differences continue to widen, with both the mean and median forecasts 
significantly higher than the actual EPS at the 0.01 level.  Panel B reports the corresponding 
statistics for the conventional spin-offs.  In contrast to the results in Panel A, we find only scant 
evidence that there is a statistical difference between reported EPS and analysts’ forecasts.   
 
 
V.  Summary and Conclusions
 
Whereas in a conventional spin-off neither the parent nor subsidiary raises capital, 
sponsored spin-offs receive a cash inflow from outside investors before going public.  We examine 
the influence of these large stakeholders on the long-run return and operating performances of the 
sponsored spin-offs and compare their performance with those of conventional spin-offs.   
We identify 57 sponsored spin-offs that occurred between January 1994 and December 2005 
and conduct performance tests on their stock returns over one- two- and three year windows 
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following the spin-off.  The sponsored spin-offs abnormal performance measure (alpha) is 
significantly negative using both equally weighted and value weighted portfolios.  In contrast, 182 
traditional spin-offs that take place over the same 12-year period record an average return 
performance over the same windows.  Furthermore, unlike the conventional spin-offs significantly 
positive announcement-day effect, the sponsored spin-offs’ two-day abnormal return is not 
statistically significant. 
We also find that parent firms under-perform over the one-year period preceding the spin-off 
and are average performers after the spin-off.  These results suggest that the subsidiary’s pre-spin-
off operating performance may have acted as a drag on the parent’s stock performance.  This, in 
turn, could have motivated the parent to divest themselves of the subsidiary via a spin-off. 
To examine these issues, we first compute the ROAs for both the sponsored spin-offs and 
their parents for the fiscal year preceding the spin-off as well as for the three fiscal years following 
the spin-off date and compare their ratios with those of their corresponding matched firms.  While 
both sponsored spin-offs and their parents record below-average performances for the year 
preceding the spin-off, only the sponsored spin-offs continue to be under-performers over each of 
the three full fiscal years after the spin-off.  In contrast, the ROAs of the conventional spin-offs are 
higher but not statistically different from their matched firms.  We also find that analysts’ EPS 
forecasts for the sponsored spin-offs are consistently higher than their reported EPS over the various 
post-event intervals.  Together, these results are consistent with the evidence that sponsored spin-
offs are under-performers over the post-event periods.  The sponsored spin-offs’ ROA results also 
suggest that the pre-event, negative stock performance of the parent-firms is due, at least in part, to 
the sub-par operating performance of the (soon-to-be) spun-off subsidiary.   
We also examine the capital expenditures and investment opportunities of the spin-offs both 
prior to and after the spin-off.  Sponsored spin-offs’ capital expenditures-to-sales ratios are 
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significantly lower than those of a portfolio of matched firms over the fiscal year preceding the 
spin-off date.  Sponsored spin-offs’ Tobin’s q is also significantly lower than its matched portfolios’ 
Tobin’s q, supporting the view that the subsidiaries’ limited pre-spin-off capital budget was driven 
by an absence of investment opportunities.  In contrast, Hertzel et al. (2002) report significantly 
higher capital expenditure ratios and lower book-to-market ratios prior to the private placement and 
attributes the private placements’ negative return performance to investor over-optimism.  We find 
no such evidence and attribute the subsidiary’s decision to seek an outside sponsor to a lack of 




1. Barber, B. M., and J. D. Lyon, 1997, “Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: the 
empirical power and specification of test statistics,” Journal of Financial Economics 43, 
341-372 
 
2. Bethel, J. E., J. P. Liebeskind, and T. Opler, 1998, “Block share purchases and corporate 
performance,” Journal of Finance 53, 605-634. 
 
3. Brav, A., W. Jiang, F. Partnoy, and R. Thomas, 2008, “Hedge fund activism, corporate 
governance, and firm performance,” Journal of Finance (Forthcoming). 
 
4. Carhart, M., 1997, “Long-run performance after stock splits: 1927 to 1996,” Journal of 
Finance 58, 1063-1086. 
 
5. Cusatis, P., J. Miles and J. R. Woolridge, 1993, “Restructuring through spinoffs: The stock 
market evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics 33, 293-311. 
 
6. Daley, L., V. Mehrotra., and R. Sivakumar, 1997, “Corporate focus and value creation: 
Evidence from spinoffs,” Journal of Financial Economics 45, 257-281. 
 
7. Danielova, A. N., 2008, “Tracking stock or spin-off? Determinants of choice,” Financial 
Management (Forthcoming). 
 
8. Desai, H. and P. Jain, 1999, “Firm performance and focus: long-run stock market 
performance following spinoffs,” Journal of Financial Economics 54, 75-101. 
 
9. Dittmar, A. and A. Shivdasani, 2003, “Divestitures and divisional investment policies,” 
Journal of Finance, 58, 2771-2743. 
 
10. Fama, E. F., 1998, “Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance,” Journal 
of Financial Economics 49, 283-306. 
 
11. Fama, E. F. and K. French, 1997, “Industry costs of equity,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 43, 153-194. 
 
12. Hertzel, M., M. Lemmon, J. Linck and L. Rees, 2002, “Long-run performance following 
private placements of equity,” Journal of Finance 57, 2595-2616. 
 
13. Hertzel, M. and R. Smith, 1993, “Market discounts and shareholder gains for placing equity 
privately,” Journal of Finance 48, 459-485. 
 
14. Jaffee, J., 1974, “Special information and insider trading,” Journal of Business 47, 410-428. 
 
15. Klein, A. and E. Zur, 2008, “Entrepreneurial shareholder activism: Hedge funds and other 
private investors,” Journal of Finance (Forthcoming). 
 
 21
16. Mandelker, G., 1974, “Risk and return:  The case of merging firms,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 1, 303-335. 
 
17. McConnell, J., M. Ozbilgin and S. Wahal, 2001, “Spin-offs, ex-ante,” Journal of Business 
74, 245-280. 
 
18. Mitchell, M., and E. Stafford, 2000, "Managerial decisions and long-term stock-price 
performance." Journal of Business 73, 287-329. 
 
19. Siddiqui, M. A., and D. L. Warganegara, 2003, “Using Spinoffs to Reduce Capital Mis-
Allocations,” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 20, 35-47. 
 
20. Veld, C., and Y. V. Veld-Merkoulova, 2006, “Value creation through spin-offs: A review of 
the empirical evidence,” Working Paper, Simon Fraser University. 
 
21.  Wruck, K., 1989, “Equity ownership value and firm value,” Journal of Financial 







Spin-off Activity from January 1994 through December 2005:  Total Spin-offs Versus 
Sponsored Spin-offs 
 
This table reports the distribution by year of completion of the total sample of 239 spin-offs and 57 
sponsored spin-offs.  In a sponsored spin-off, the subsidiary sells-off a portion of its outstanding equity 
to an outside investor (sponsor) before going public.  All proceeds from the sale accrue to the subsidiary 
rather than the parent firm. The initial listing of spin-offs was obtained from the Security Data 
Corporation’s Mergers and Acquisitions database.  The Wall Street Journal Index and EDGAR database 
were jointly used to confirm those firms that qualify as a spin-off, the date of the spin-offs, the name of 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year Total Spin-offs Sponsored Spin-offs % of Total Spin-offs
1999-2005 120 41 34.2 
1994-1998 119 16 13.4 
    




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year Total Spin-offs Sponsored Spin-offs % of Total Spin-offs
2005 13 5 38.5 
2004 14 6 42.9 
2003 18 5 27.8 
2002 25 7 28.0 
2001 8 1 12.5 
2000 17 6 35.3 
1999 25 11 44.0 
1998 24 6 25.0 
1997 24 6 25.0 
1996 21 1 4.8 
1995 27 2 7.4 
1994 23 1 4.6 
 






This table reports the medians and means of several firm characteristics for four sample groups: 
sponsored spin-offs, conventional spin-offs, parents of sponsored spin-offs, and parents of conventional 
spin-offs.  Panels A and B show the total assets, net sales, market value of equity and book value of 
equity-to-market value of equity for the fiscal year preceding the spin-off date and the spin-off date.  For 
the spin-off date, the market value of equity is based on each sample firm’s closing share price on the 
spin-off date, while book values are based on the fiscal year preceding the spin-off date.  Financial data 
were obtained from annual reports and the Compustat database.  The statistical tests are for differences 
between the means or medians. 
 













  Median Mean Median Mean 
Sponsored 57 605.9 1421.1*** 486.5 1230.7** 
Conventional 182 521.6 2904.8 465.7 1878.4 
 
PARENTS      
Sponsored 57 1481.3 4004.7*** 1543.4 3214.6*** 




















To Market Value 
  Median Mean Median Mean 
Sponsored 57 402.2** 1018.8 0.89** 0.62** 
Conventional 182 207.8 1190.4 0.63 0.43 
 
PARENTS      
Sponsored 57 2145.0 2591.4** 0.48* 0.44 
Conventional 182 1859.6 5065.3 0.37 0.41 
 
           
    *  statistically significant at the 0.10 level  
  **  statistically significant at the 0.05 level  




Stock Performances of Sponsored Spin-offs and Conventional Spin-offs 
over the 1994-2005 Sample Period 
 
This table reports the one-two- and three-year performance measures (alphas) for the sponsored and conventional 
spin-offs using the calendar-time portfolio approach.  Both equally weighted and value weighted monthly returns 
are used to compute the parameter estimators over the sample period.  RMRF is the value-weighted market return 
on all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq firms (RM) minus the risk-free rate (RF), which is the one-month treasury bill rate.  
SMB (small minus big) is the difference each month between the return on small firms and big firms.  HML (high 
minus low) is the difference each month between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the 
return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks.  UMD (up minus down, or momentum) portfolios for month t 
(formed at the end of month t-1) are based on returns over month -13 through month -2 and are constructed 
monthly.  White-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates.  Levels of 
significance are shown only for the intercept estimates. 
 
Panel A:  Sponsored Spin-offs (n=57)
 
1-Year  2-year  3-year 
 EWT  VWT  EWT  VWT  EWT  VWT
Alpha -0.0133**  -0.0108*  -0.0161** -0.0121**  -0.0151** -0.0133**
 (-2.0691)  (-1.8652)  (-2.2776) (-1.9932)  (-2.3141) (-2.1844) 
RMRF 0.0109  0.0102  0.0125 0.0104  0.01105 0.0117 
 (3.1200)  (3.1250)  (6.3271) (5.6261)  (7.8643) (7.0453) 
SMB 0.0095  0.0052  0.0136 0.0057  0.01160 0.00090 
 (2.8888)  (1.5939)  (6.2945) (3.0570)  (8.2206) (5.3815) 
HML 0.0042  0.0008  0.0076 0.0042  0.0080 0.0045 
 (1.0059)  (0.1876)  2.9670 (1.7555)  (4.4710) (2.1395) 
UMD -0.0092  0.0072  -0.0066 -0.0042  -0.0055 -0.0023 
 (-4.0847)  (-3.2206)  -4.8074 (-3.3382)  (-5.7138) (-2.0141) 
R2 0.267  0.223  0.500 0.362  0.626 0.498 
 
Panel B:  Conventional Spin-offs (n=182) 
 
1-Year  2-year  3-year 
 EWT  VWT  EWT  VWT  EWT  VWT
Alpha 0.0108  0.0133 0.0050 0.0161** 0.0084 0.0151** 
    (0.865)     (1.069)    (0.658)    (2.277)    (1.236)    (2.314) 
RMRF 0.0071  0.0057 0.0095 0.0092 0.0099 0.0118 
 (1.3707)  (1.8817) (7.0232) (6.0821) (9.9880) (8.1369) 
SMB 0.01250  0.0032 0.0058 0.0011 0.0057 0.0024 
 (2.5790)  (1.1406) (4.5259) (0.7743) (6.0827) (1.7048) 
HML 0.0226  0.0073 0.0066 0.0010 0.0069 0.0060 
 (2.8395)  (1.5966) (3.7771) (0.5175) (5.5185) (3.2774) 
UMD 0.0007  -0.0009 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0005 
 (0.1476)  (-0.3062) (-0.01481) (0.638) (-0.8768) (-0.5902) 
R2 0.143  0.069 0.512 0.497 0.683 0.555 
               
    *  statistically significant at the 0.10 level  
  **  statistically significant at the 0.05 level  




Stock Performances of the Parent Firms of Sponsored and Conventional Spin-offs 
over the 1994-2005 Sample Period 
 
This table reports the one-two- and three-year performance measures (alphas) for the parent firms of the sponsored 
and conventional spinoffs using the calendar-time portfolio approach.  Both equally weighted and value weighted 
monthly returns are used to compute the parameter estimators over the sample period.  RMRF is the value-weighted 
market return on all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq firms (RM) minus the risk-free rate (RF), which is the one-month treasury 
bill rate.  SMB (small minus big) is the difference each month between the return on small firms and big firms.  HML 
(high minus low) is the difference each month between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the 
return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks.  UMD (up minus down, or momentum) portfolios for month t 
(formed at the end of month t-1) are based on returns over month -13 through month -2 and are constructed monthly.  
White-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates.  Levels of significance are shown 
only for the intercept estimates. 
 
Panel A:  Parents of Sponsored Spin-offs (n=54) 
 
Pre-12 month  1-Year  2-Year  3-Year 
 EWT  VWT  EWT  VWT  EWT  VWT  EWT  VWT
Alpha -0.0092*  -0.0085*  -0.0057  0.0029  0.0024  0.0061  -0.0030  0.0087 
 (-1.8923)  (-1.7488)  (-1.0905)  (0.3262)  (0.3156)  (1.1759)  (-0.5894)  (1.5129) 
RMRF 0.0144  0.0126  0.0100  0.0079  0.0129  0.0114  0.0122  0.0096 
 (7.8139)  (6.7890)  (4.2820)  (3.3610)  (6.4163)  (5.3067)  (9.3204)  (5.8418) 
SMB 0.0084  0.0040  0.0049  0.0021  0.0039  -0.0031  0.0061  -0.0029 
 (4.5357)  (2.1447)  (2.1051)  (0.8685)  (1.9322)  (-1.4646)  (4.6345)  (-1.7290) 
HML 0.0054  0.0018  0.0019  -0.0065  0.0019  -0.0060  0.0059  -0.0047 
 (2.2295)  (0.4809)  (0.6401)  (-2.1358)  (0.7224)  (-2.1777)  (3.5424)  (-2.2484) 
UMD -0.0016  -0.0014  -0.0038  -0.0035  -0.0042  -0.0029  -0.0039  -0.0028 
 (-1.1005)  (-0.9682)  (-2.3664)  (-2.1411)  (-3.0536)  (-1.9813)  (-4.3328)  (-2.5235) 
R2 0.480  0.412  0.265  0.305  0.408  0.382  0.595  0.453 
 
Panel B:  Parents of Conventional Spin-offs (n=173) 
 
Pre-12 month  1-Year  2-Year  3-Year 
 EWT  VWT  EWT  VWT  EWT  VWT  EWT  VWT
Alpha 0.0129  0.0049  0.0118  0.0132  0.0008  0.0062  -0.0008  0.0075 
 (1.4355)  (0.7548)  (1.6135)  (1.6902)*  (0.1545)  (0.6238)  (-0.1741)  (0.8628) 
RMRF 0.0122  0.0139  0.0133  0.0128  0.0115  0.0136  0.0112  0.0123 
 (4.9276)  (7.8053)  (6.2280)  (5.7411)  (8.1770)  (5.3225)  (10.1542)  (6.0877) 
SMB 0.0074  0.0039  0.0057  -0.0032  0.0029  0.0015  0.0046  0.0017 
 (2.3616)  (1.7455)  (2.8731)  (-1.5638)  (2.1809)  0.6356  (4.3457)  (0.8957) 
HML 0.0044  0.0118  0.0084  0.0053  0.0056  0.0070  0.0074  0.0070 
 (1.0263)  (3.8184)  (2.5571)  (1.555)  (3.0631)  (2.1115)  (5.2136)  (2.7208) 
UMD -0.0022  -0.0020  -0.0046  -0.0011  -0.0020  0.0047  -0.0010  0.0022 
 (-0.7138)  (-0.8813)  (-2.3236)  (0.5541)  (-2.3138)  (3.021)  (-1.4362)  (1.6980) 
R2 0.372  0.515  0.448  0.439  0.590  0.359  0.667  0.373 
 
               
    *  statistically significant at the 0.10 level  
  **  statistically significant at the 0.05 level  
***  statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
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 Table V 
Return on Total Assets:  Sponsored Spin-offs and Parent Firms 
 
This table reports the return on total assets for the fiscal year preceding the spin-off date and each of the three full fiscal years 
following the spin-off date for the sponsored spin-offs and the parents of sponsored spin-offs.  The return on total assets is 
defined as the ratio of operating income (EBITDA) to year-end total assets.  We compare each sample’s performance with its 
respective matched portfolio’s operating income return on total assets for the same fiscal year.  A matched firm is defined as 
one in the same industry as the corresponding spin-off based on Fama and French’s 48 industry classification, whose total 
market value of equity (TMV) is within 10% of the spin-off’s TMV of equity on the date of the spin-off.  If there are less 
than five control firms with a TMV within 10% of the sample firm’s value, we also include those with a value within 20% of 
the sample firm’s size.  We then select the matched firm with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the sample firm.  We 
also require that it has the same fiscal year as the sample firm.  Financial data are from annual reports and the Compustat 
database.  The Wilcoxon (Z) stat. tests for differences in medians. The t-stat. tests for differences in means between the two 
groups.  N is the number of firms. 
 
Panel A:  Sponsored Spin-offs 
 
Year -1 N Median (%) Z-stat Mean (%) T-stat 
Sponsored spin-offs 57 7.80 8.28 





Year +1      
Sponsored spin-offs 46 6.12 4.76 





Year +2      
Sponsored spin-offs 40 7.51 6.02 





Year +3      
Sponsored spin-offs 33 6.44 5.87 





Panel B:  Parent Firms 
 
Year -1 N Median (%) Z-stat Mean (%) T-stat 
Parents of sponsored spin-offs 53 8.83 7.78 





Year +1      
Parents of sponsored spin-offs 53 11.63 10.83 





Year +2      
Parents of sponsored spin-offs 44 10.76 9.62 





Year +3      
Parents of sponsored spin-offs 37 12.21 10.81 





    *  significant at the 0.10 level  
  **  significant at the 0.05 level  




Capital Expenditures/Net Sales and Tobin’s q:  Sponsored Spin-offs 
 
This table reports the sponsored spin-offs’ capital expenditures as a percentage of net sales and Tobin’s q for the fiscal year 
preceding the spin-off date and the first three full fiscal years following the spin-off date.  We compare each sample’s 
performance with its respective matched portfolio.  A matched firm is defined as one in the same industry as the 
corresponding spin-off based on Fama and French’s 48 industry classification, whose total market value of equity (TMV) is 
within 10% of the spin-off’s TMV of equity on the date of the spin-off.  If there are less than five control firms within 10% of 
the sample firm’s value, we also include those with a value within 20% of the sample firm’s size.  We then select the 
matched firm with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the sample firm.  We also require that it has the same fiscal year 
as the sample firm.  Financial data are from annual reports and the Compustat database.  The Wilcoxon (Z) stat. tests for 
differences in medians. The t-stat. tests for differences in means between the two groups.  N is the number of firms. 
 
Panel A: Capital Expenditures/Net Sales 
 
Year -1 N Median (%) Z-stat Mean (%) T-stat 
Sponsored spin-offs 57 4.74 7.08 





Year +1      
Sponsored spin-offs 46 6.18 11.24 





Year +2      
Sponsored spin-offs 40 5.21 9.36 





Year +3      
Sponsored spin-offs 33 4.48 8.29 





Panel B:  Tobin’s q 
 
Year -1 N Median (%) Z-stat Mean (%) T-stat 
Sponsored spin-offs 57 0.78 1.23 





Year +1      
Sponsored spin-offs 46 0.69 1.08 





Year +2      
Sponsored spin-offs 40 0.61 1.01 





Year +3      
Sponsored spin-offs 33 0.54 0.85 





    *  significant at the 0.10 level  
  **  significant at the 0.05 level  
***  significant at the 0.01 level 
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Table VII 
Return on Total Assets: Conventional Spin-offs and Parent Firms 
 
This table reports the return on total assets for the fiscal year preceding the spin-off date and each of the three full fiscal years 
following the spin-off date for the sponsored spin-offs and the parents of sponsored spin-offs.  The return on total assets is 
defined as the ratio of operating income (EBITDA) to the year-end total assets.  We compare each sample’s performance 
with its respective matched portfolio’s operating income return on total assets for the same fiscal year.  A matched firm is 
defined as one in the same industry as the corresponding spin-off based on Fama and French’s 48 industry classification, 
whose total market value of equity (TMV) is within 10% of the spin-off’s TMV of equity on the date of the spin-off.   If there 
are less than five control firms with a TMV within 10% of the sample firm’s value, we also include those with a value within 
20% of the sample firm’s size.  We then select the matched firm with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the sample 
firm.  We also require that it has the same fiscal year as the sample firm.  Financial data were obtained from annual reports 
and the Compustat database.  The Wilcoxon (Z) stat. tests for differences in medians. The t-stat. tests for differences in means 
between the two groups.  N is the number of firms. 
 
Panel A:  Conventional Spin-offs 
 
Year -1 N Median (%) Z-stat Mean (%) T-stat 
Conventional spin-offs 169 12.86 12.27 





Year +1      
Conventional spin-offs 164 13.47 14.58 





Year +2      
Conventional spin-offs 153 13.13 14.97 





Year +3      
Conventional spin-offs 139 14.20 15.21 





Panel B:  Parent Firms 
 
Year -1 N Median (%) Z-stat Mean (%) T-stat 
Parents of Conventional spin-offs 182 15.69 14.85 





Year +1      
Parents of Conventional spin-offs 173 10.96 11.87 





Year +2      
Parents of Conventional spin-offs 161 14.47 13.64 





Year +3      
Parents of Conventional spin-offs 148 9.02 11.02 





    *  significant at the 0.10 level  
  **  significant at the 0.05 level  




Capital Expenditures/Net Sales and Tobin’s q:  Conventional Spin-offs 
 
This table reports the sponsored spin-offs’ capital expenditures as a percentage of net sales and Tobin’s q for the fiscal year 
preceding the spin-off date and the first three full fiscal years following the spin-off date.  We compare each sample’s 
performance with its respective matched portfolio.  A matched firm is defined as one in the same industry as the 
corresponding spin-off based on Fama and French’s 48 industry classification, whose total market value of equity (TMV) is 
within 10% of the spin-off’s TMV of equity on the date of the spin-off.  If there are less than five control firms within 10% of 
the sample firm’s value, we also include those with a value within 20% of the sample firm’s size.  We then select the 
matched firm with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the sample firm.  We also require that it has the same fiscal year 
as the sample firm.  Financial data were obtained from annual reports and the Compustat database.  The Wilcoxon (Z) stat. 
tests for differences in medians. The t-stat. tests for differences in means between the two groups.  N is the number of firms.. 
 
Panel A: Capital Expenditures/Net Sales 
 
Year -1 N Median (%) Z-stat Mean (%) T-stat 
Conventional spin-offs 169 5.25 9.05 





Year +1      
Conventional spin-offs 164 4.59 8.10 





Year +2      
Conventional spin-offs 153 4.36 7.20 





Year +3      
Conventional spin-offs 139 4.13 7.12 





Panel B:  Tobin’s q 
 
Year -1 N Median (%) Z-stat Mean (%) T-stat 
Conventional spin-offs 169 1.46 1.68 





Year +1      
Conventional spin-offs 164 1.52 1.95 





Year +2      
Conventional spin-offs 153 1.64 1.82 





Year +3      
Conventional spin-offs 139 1.62 2.08 





    *  significant at the 0.10 level  
  **  significant at the 0.05 level  




Reported Earnings Per Share Versus Forecasted Earnings Per Share of 
Sponsored and Conventional Spin-offs for the Three Years Including and Following the Spin-off 
 
This table compares the mean and median annual earnings per share (EPS) for our samples of sponsored and 
conventional spin-offs with analysts’ EPS forecasts for the current fiscal year (year 0) and the following two fiscal 
years (years 1 and 2).  All analysts’ forecasts were made within 60 calendar days following the date of the spin-
off.  The t-statistic tests for differences in means between the two groups.  The Wilcoxon (Z) statistic tests for 
differences in medians.  N is the number of analysts’ forecasts for each fiscal year. 
 
Panel A:  Sponsored Spin-offs 
 
Year 0 N Mean (%) T-stat Median (%) Z-stat 
Forecasted EPS 50 $0.429 $0.725 





Year +1      
Forecasted EPS 46 $0.868 $0.984 





Year +2      
Forecasted EPS 35 $0.990 $1.068 






Panel B:  Conventional Spin-offs 
 
Year 0 N Mean (%) T-stat Median (%) Z-stat 
Forecasted EPS 102 $0.523 $0.540 





Year +1      
Forecasted EPS 98 $0.712 $0.778 





Year +2      
Forecasted EPS 86 $0.863 $0.967 





              
   *   statistically significant at the 0.10 level  
 **   statistically significant at the 0.05 level  
























2.  Agere Systems 6/3/02 Lucent Technologies Warburg Pincus 
 
  7.0 
 
3.  Allegheny Teledyne 11/30/99 Mego Financial J.P. Morgan  5.2 
 
4.  Angio Dynamics 10/29/04 E-Z-EM H.S. Stern 15.1 
 
5.  Arch Chemical 2/22/99 Olin Corp Franklin Mutual Advisors 12.0 
 
6.  Avaya 10/02/00 Lucent Technology Warburg Pincus   8.7 
 
7.  Aztec Technology 6/10/98 U.S. Office Banpost Group 11.0 
 
8.  Ben Franklin 10/3/95 Fox Meyer FMR Corp. 
Wisconsin Retirement Fund 
10.0 
  7.3 
 
9.  BioVeris Corp. 2/13/04 Meso Scale Diagnostics Credit Suisse F.B.   5.2 
 
10. Brillian Corp 9/16/03 Three-Five Systems Oppenheimer Funds 19.5 
 
11. Centex Construction 
Products 
 
1/30/04 Centex Corp. Artisan Partners Ltd.   7.8 
 
12. Ceva 11/1/02 DSP Group Inc. Ollaberry Ltd. 
Brian Long 
  8.4 
  9.3 
 
13. Chaparral Steel 7/29/05 TXI Witmer Asset Mgnt.   7.1 
 
14. Choice Hotels 10/15/97 Starwood Hotels Banco Corp. 
Boron Capital 
28.0 
  5.8 
 
15. CIRCOR 10/19/99 Watts Ind. Gabelli Fund   6.5 
 
16. Cognizant Technology 
Solutions Corp. 
 
2/7/03 IMS Health FMR Corp. 
Wasatch Advisors Inc. 
Pilgrim, Baxter, Greig & 
Assoc. 
 
   13.0 
     3.4 
     4.3 
17. CommScope 7/23/97 General Instruments Forstmann Little   7.4 
 
18. Consolidated Tomoka 
Land 
 
9/24/99 Baker Fentress W. Buffet   5.7 
 






















21. Dover Downs Gaming & 
Entertainment 
 
4/1/02 Dover Motorsports Gabelli Funds  6.11 
 





23. Genisis Health Ventures 12/2/03 Elder Trust The Goldman Sachs Group 
 
10.2 
24. Gentiva Health 3/16/00 Olsten Greenhaven   9.5 
 




Scoggin Capital Mngmt. 
Andrew McKelvey 




26. Huttig Bldg. Prod. 12/16/99 Crane Rugby and RMC 
Crane Fund 
32.0 
  8.4 
 
27. IMS Health 7/27/99 Gartner Group Price Rowe   6.2 
 
28. Insignia Financial Group 
 
9/22/98 Altiva Financial A. Farcos 26.0 
 
29. Interstate Hotels 6/28/99 Patriot Amer. Hosp. Prudential 10.0 
 
30. Key 3 Media 8/18/00 Ziff Davis Morgan Stanley 
Invemed 
  9.5 
  6.5 
 
31. Levitt Corp. 1/2/04 Bankatlantic BFC Fin. Corp 15.3 
 
32. Liberty Media Int’l 6/7/04 Liberty Media Corp. Primacom AG    26.7 
 
33. Ladenberg, Thalman 
Financial Services Inc. 
 
3/15/05 New Valley Corp. Frost-Nevada Inv. Trust 37.3 
 
34. Mego Mortgage 9/3/97 Mego Financial FBR Oppenhiemer Fund   7.0 
 




36. Mirant Corp. 7/17/03 Utility Holders Trust Vanguard Windsor Funds   7.2 
 
37. Mykrolis 2/27/02 Millipore Corp. PRIMECAP Mngmt. Co. 
 
12.5 
38. Next Level Systems 7/28/97 General Instruments Forstmann Little   8.4 
 
39. Octel Corp. 5/26/98 Great Lakes Chemical Halo Capital   6.9 
 

















41. Omnova Solutions 10/4/99 Gencorp Gabelli Fund   7.7 
 
42. Packaging Dynamics 7/1/02 Ivex Packaging Corp. DCBS Investors 51.8 
 
43. Pactiv 11/5/99 Tenneco Auto. Highland Capital   7.5 
 
44. Pharmacopeia Drug 
Discovery 
 
4/30/04 Pharmacopeia Wellington Mngmt. Co. 12.2 
 
45. PHH Corp. 1/30/05 Cendant SAB Capital Partners 13.8 
 
46. RCN Corp. 10/1/97 CTec Corp Kiewet Hldg. 48.0 
 
47. RJ Reynolds 6/15/99 RJR Nabisco Ross Financial   9.9 
 
48. Sabre Holding 3/15/00 AMR Corp. FMR Corp. 
IGI 
Inv. Retirement 
  5.0 
  9.0 
  9.0 
 
49. Smucker J.M. Co. 6/1/02 Proctor & Gamble Ariel Capital Mngmt.  9.9 
 
50. Surebeam Corp.  8/5/02 Titan Corp. State of Wisconsin 
Inv. Board 
Harris Assoc. Inv. Trust 
13.4 
 
  9.5 
 
51. TCI Satellite 12/31/96 Tele-Communication JP Morgan 
Assoc. Inv. 
11.8 
  8.4 
 
52. Transpro 10/11/95 Allen Group Gabelli Fund   5.0 
 
53. Treehouse Foods 6/27/05 Dean Foods Highlands Capital Mngmt. 
 
14.2 





55. Ventiv Health 9/21/99 Snyder AMCAP Fund 17.5 
 
56. Western Atlas 3/17/94 Litton Ind. FMR Corp. 
Hein Securities 
  5.4 
  5.2 
 
57. Williams Comm. Group 4/23/01 Williams Co. Warburg Pincus 10.0 
 
 
